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Public Employment, Collective Bargaining 
and the Conventional Wisdom : 
U.S.A. and Canada 
W. B. Cunningham 
The author states that the conventional wisdom has 
viewed collective bargaining in the public service as unne-
cessary, impractical and illégal. And he adds that, in 
gênerai, and until recently, the prevailing practices in the 
United States and Canada hâve been in close harmony with 
the conventional wisdom. But the restless change of events 
threatens the existing state of affairs, described by the con-
ventional wisdom, with progressive obsolescence. And the 
author answers the two following questions: Can the indus-
trial relations System of the private sector be applied to 
public employment? To what extent does the nature of 
government employment raise unique problems? 
The enemy of the conventional wisdom is 
not ideas but the march of events. 
J.K. GALBRAITH, 
« The Affluent Society » 
Introduction 
By the « conventional wisdom » Professor Galbraith means those 
ideas which are esteemed at any time for their acceptability. Because 
people find it convenient and comfortable to retain their familiar inter-
prétation of the world around them thèse acceptable ideas hâve great 
stability. The relationship between the constantly changing world of 
events on the one hand and the ideas that interpret them on the other, 
is one in which the conventional wisdom is always in danger of obso-
lescence. There is, according to Galbraith, a continuai tendency for 
the world of acceptable ideas to 
îose their usefulness or validity in 
interpreting the world of events. 
As he states it (and quite contrary 
CUNNINGHAM, W. B., Ph.D. 
(Brown University), Professor of 
Economies, Mount Allison Univer-
sity. 
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to the often-quoted statement by Keynes): « ïdeas are inherently conser-
vative. They yield not to the attack of other ideas but to the massive 
onslaught of circumstance with which they cannot contend. » * 
Something like this has been happening in the United States and 
Canada with regard to collective bargaining in government employ-
ment. There has existed a fairly well-defined conventional wisdom 
which post-war events hâve been making obsolète. Eventually a new 
conventional wisdom will replace the old. In the meantime the current 
trends are raising a host of questions with légal and practical impli-
cations. 
The Conventional Wisdom 
The conventional wisdom has viewed collective bargaining in the 
public service as unnecessary, impractical, and illégal. It is unnecessary 
because govemments hâve already granted their employées wages, 
working conditions, pensions, sick leave, insurance plans, holidays, 
vacations, and so on — in short, ail the benefits that employées in the 
private sector hâve gained through collective bargaining. The govern-
ment is not a profit-seeking employer. It is not subject to those pres-
sures, emanating from compétitive markets or private greed, to give 
employées only the necessary minimum. Instead, government follow 
a policy of providing benefits similar to those granted by « good » pri-
vate firms. Little more could be expected through a System of collective 
bargaining. 
No one dénies the evil of the former spoils system and the injustices 
of it to the individual employée. But govemments hâve replaced the 
spoils system by merit Systems. Compétitive examinations impartially 
administered now govern hirings, promotions, and transfers. In view 
of thèse enlightened practices collective bargaining to obtain either 
économie benefits or individual justice is not necessary. 
Suppose that critics of this conventional wisdom make a good argu-
ment for the benefits obtainable from a workable system of collective 
bargaining. It is easy to show, for instance, that govemments below 
the fédéral level hâve not ail eliminated the spoils system, that not ail 
govemments provide employment benefits équivalent to those provided 
(1) GALBRAITH, J. K., «The Affluent Society », Pélican édition, 1962, p. 27. 
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by « good » private employers, and that within the merit System there 
remains much scope for daily individual injustices and personal grie-
vances. Such critics encounter another part of the conventional wisdom's 
defence of the status quo, the idea that collective bargaining in govem-
ment is unworkable. 
Collective bargaining is unworkable for at least two reasons. Déci-
sions on issues that form much of the substance of collective agreements 
are directly or ultimately the responsibility of an elected législative 
body which in turn is responsible to the gênerai public. Thèse légis-
lative bodies must retain their decision-making powers over items with 
important budgetary implications. But the composition of such bodies 
(competing and often antagonistic political parties and factions) and 
their operating methods (public debates) make them unsuitable for the 
rôle of negotiators on one side of a bargaining conférence with their 
employées. 
The second reason is the impotency of the employée unions in the 
event of an impasse in négociations. Unions of government employées, 
so the argument goes, cannot strike effectively against the government. 
Such strikes are often illégal. Even if legally permitted to strike the 
services of government are so vital to society, and the public outcry is 
likely to be so loud, that no public employée union can hope to gain 
by such action. Deprived of the effective use of strikes the unions hâve 
little or no bargaining power. The distribution of power is too lop-sided 
for bargaining to be a practical arrangement. Should an impasse occur 
it would be resolved, in one way or another, by a unilatéral décision 
of the government. 
Critics of this part of the conventional wisdom may suggest, of 
course, that die législative body should authorize top administrators to 
perform the bargaining function. Another suggestion is to use third-
party arbitration as an équitable substitute for a union's lack of effective 
striking power. To such suggestions the conventional wisdom invokes 
légal arguments as a third part of its défense against change. 
This brings the discussion into the realm of political ideas and 
théories of government. The state possesses sovereign powers. The 
idea of sovereignty is the idea that there must réside somewhere in the 
body politic an ultimate and final source of légal authority. The relevant 
question is whether the possession of sovereign power by the state inhe-
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rently precludes the possibility of collective bargaining between the 
state and its employées.2 This question the conventional wisdom has 
answered with a self-évident yes.8 A sovereign government, it is argued, 
cannot be compelled by lesser bodies to do anything that it choose not 
to do, and it cannot enter into contractual arrangements that bind its 
freedom to exercise its sovereign power in the future. 
In addition to this political idea of sovereignty there are the légal 
iules restricting the délégation of power. Thèse rules are especially 
important in the U.S.A., with its constitutional system of checks and 
balances in which specified functions and powers hâve been allocated 
to each of the three branches of government. A décision 4 of the Mis-
souri Suprême Court in 1947 shows the relevance of thèse rules. 
It is a familiar principle of constitutional law that the législature 
cannot delegate its législative powers and any attempted délégation 
thereof is void. If such powers cannot be delegated, they surely cannot 
be contracted or bargained away ; and certainly not by any adminis-
trative or executive officers who cannot hâve any législative powers.,. 
Thus qualifications, tenure, compensation, and working conditions of 
public officers and employées are wholly matters of law making and 
cannot be the subject of bargaining or contract. 
This complètes the inventory of the conventional wisdom arsenal. 
Collective bargaining in the public service is unnecessary, impractical, 
and illégal. Thèse hâve been the agreeable and acceptable ideas 
expounded in both Canada and the United States, but perhaps more 
strongly held in the latter country. In both countries this conventional 
wisdom is currently being seriously challlenged. North and south of 
the border, changing practices indicate a trend towards collective 
bargaining for government employées. To appreciate the nature of this 
trend it may be useful to outline the conventional practice before noting 
some of the changes. 
The Conventional Practice 
In gênerai, and until recently, the prevailing practices in the United 
States and Canada hâve been in close harmony with the conventional 
(2) GODINE, M.R., « The Labor Problem in the Public Service : A Study in Poli-
tical Puralism ». Harvard University Press, 1951, p. 41. 
(3) For some examples in the United States see : HAUT, WÏLSON R., « Collective 
Bargaining in the Fédéral Civil Service », Harper and Bros., N.Y., 1961, pp. 10-32, 
(4) « Springfield v. Clouse », 206 S.W. 2nd 539, 545 (1947). Quoted in Hait 
op. cit., p. 48. 
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wisdom as outlined above. This agreement has been close at the fédéral, 
state, and provincial levels of government; not so close for the less-than 
sovereign municipal governments. 
Organisations of fédéral civil servants existed before the turn of 
the century. In the United States the lettercarriers combined in 1868 
to press for an eight-hour day.5 Lettercarriers in Canada organized a 
union in 1891.6 Early in the présent century protests against the execu-
tive orders (gag rules) of Présidents Roosevelt and Taft, which deprived 
government employées of their right to pétition Congress on their own 
behalf, induced Congress to pass the Lloyd — La Follette Act of 1912. 
This Act, in its effect, secured the right of fédéral employées to belong 
to unions and, individually or collectively, to pétition Congress. Five 
years later non-postal white-collar workers formed the National Fédé-
ration of Fédéral Employées and affiliated with the A.F.L.7 Organi-
sations of civil servants in Ottawa hâve existed for about 50 years. Thus 
fédéral employées in both countries hâve had the right to organize and 
some of their organisations hâve existed for many years. 
Thèse organisations hâve not had collective bargaining rights. Tra-
ditionally they hâve had two channels of influence. They could exert 
some direct influence when, and if, they were consulted, presented 
briefs to higher authorities, or if they participated in those councils or 
committees that hâve been formed to promote joint discussions. (Canada, 
for example, established a National Joint Council in 1944).s In gênerai 
employées and their organisations hâve not had the formai right to be 
consulted about proposed changes, and their powers hâve not extended 
beyond making suggestions, recommendations, or pleas. The pleas of 
supplicants hâve not necessarily been ineffective but the relationship has 
been one of paternalism, not bargaining. 
The other channel of influence (from a bargaining point of view an 
indirect influence) has been the exertion of political pressure on the 
(5) SCHNEIDER, B.V.H., € Collective Bargaining and the Fédéral Civil Service», 
ïnaustrial Relations : A Journal of Economy and Society, May, 1964, p. 104. 
(6) ANDRAS, A., € Collective Bargaining By Civil Servants », Industrial Relations -
Relations industrielles, Vol. 8, January 1958, p. 41. 
(7) SPERO, S. «Government as Employer», N.Y., Remsen Press, 1948, p. 178. 
The N.F.F.E. later withdrew from the A.F.L. in 1931. Ibid., p. 190. 
(8) For a list of the Council's shortcomings, see : BEST, J.C., « The Government 
as Employer», Industrial Relations - Relations industrielles, Vol. 16, No. 2 {April, 
1961), pp. 171-172. 
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government. In the absence of bargaining rights and formai procédures 
some employée associations developed skillful techniques for obtaining 
the support of politicians and the attention of public opinion. Thèse 
activities — professional pleading, political lobbying, public relations 
— cannot be cailed collective bargaining. 
There is a paucity of information about the practices that hâve 
existed in the governments of the indivdual states in the U.S.A. In 
gênerai they seem to hâve followed the fédéral pattern. Writing on 
this topic in 1961 Hart said that « labor-management relations at the 
state level parallel normal fédéral practices too closely to merit a great 
deal of attention ».9 Students of unionism and collective bargaining 
appear to hâve largely ignored the association of public employées at 
the state level. The editor of the Industrial and Labor Relations Review 
introduced an article in the July 1962 issue as « an initial effort to des-
cribe and analyze the common features... of 25 independent public 
employée associations ».10 At least two of thèse associations had existed 
for 50 years, and 14 of them existed before 1946. The author of the 
article reported that their major functions were membership recruitment 
and législative représentation.ai As might be expected there was much 
variation from one state to another. It is clear, however, that collective 
bargainng played little or no part in the employment relationships. 
Another practice in line with the conventional wisdom should be 
noted. Since 1945 at least 10 States, by législation, hâve outlawed 
strikes by state employées.12 In those states without explicit législative 
prohibitions the prevailing view is that the courts would rule out such 
strikes. A leading writer has said that in the United States, « the slogan 
'one cannot strike against the government' has become an article of faith 
to be accepted without question ».18 Some states hâve gone beyond 
merely outlawing strikes and forbid union membership for state em-
ployées. 14 
(9) HART, W., op. cit., p. 133. 
(10) Page 510. The article is : KRISLOV, JOSEPH, «The Independent Public 
Employée Association : Characteristics and Functions », pp. 510-520. 
(11) Ibid., p. 511. Also, see : SPERO, S., op. cit., ch. 10, and pp. 223-225. 
(12) NORTHRUP, H.R., BLOOM, CF. , «Government and Labor », Homewood, 111., 
R.D. Irwin, Inc., 1963, p. 458. 
(13) SPERO, STERLING, « Collective Bargaining in Public Employment : Fonn and 
Scope », Public Administration Review, Vol. XXII, No. 1 (Winter, 1962), p. 4. 
(14) NORTHRUP, H.R., BLOOM, C F . , op. cit., p. 463, note 11. It should also be 
noted that the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, Sec. 305, outlawed strikes by fédéral 
employées, and that Congress in 1955 stiffened the punitive provisions; See : 
HART, W.R., op. cit., pp. 34-35, and note 39. 
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With one exception the Canadian provinces hâve likewise followed 
the conventional wisdom. In Saskatchewan, the exception to the rule, 
the govemment began collective bargaining with its organised civil 
servants following the électoral victory of the C.C.F. in 1944. But the 
majoriry of Canadians continued to look upon this socialist govemment 
as an unwelcome aberration in the Canadian political environment. The 
tendency was to scorn rather than to emulate the socialist innovations. 
At the other extrême has been the Province of Québec. Législation 
in that Province imposed severe restraints on collective action by provin-
cial and municipal employées. Similar législation also applied to 
employées in a wide range of public service actvities, regardless of 
whether the enterprises were privately or publicly owned. This légis-
lation outlawed strikes and imposed compulsory binding arbitration. 
For employées of the Province covered by the Civil Service Act, the 
Civil Service Commission acted as the council of arbitration.1B The 
law permitted provincial employées to form their own associations but 
prohibited affiliation with other organized labour groups. Activities of 
the two staff associations did not extend beyond recreational and cultural 
pursuits.ie 
In other provinces some staff associations can be traced back to the 
1920's. Until relatively recently they functioned primarily as social clubs 
or co-operative societies.17 There has been freedom of association but 
no developed System of collective bargaining. 
At the municipal level of govemment in both countries the fédéral, 
state, and provincial pattem has now been broken for many years. 
Unionism and collective bargaining in Canadian municipalities had 
become sufficiently common by 1953 that the Canadian Fédération of 
Mayors and Municipalities financed a spécial study of it.18 The post 
Second World War growth of municipal collective bargaining has 
continued. Unlike the expérience of many unions during the last décade 
(15) WOODS, H.D., OSTRY, S., « Labour Policy and Labour Economies in Canada », 
Toronto, Macmillan of Canada, 1962, pp. 223-4. 
(16) SCAHROW, H.A., c Employer-Employée Relationships in the Civil Services 
of the Canadian Provinces », Public Administration, Spring 1957, p. 65. 
( 17) Ibid.y p. 65. For a full-scale study of staff relations at the fédéral and provin-
cial levels, see : FRANKEL, SAUL, «Staff Relations in the Civil Service : The Canadian 
Expérience », Montréal, McGill University Press, 1962. 
(18) FRANKEL, S.J., PRATT, R.C., «Municipal Labour Relations in Canada», 
Montréal, Industrial Relations Centre, McGill University, 1954. 
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the Ieading unions of municipal workers substantially increased their 
membership. Collective agreements are now a common practice in 
Canadian municipalities. 
In the United States, municipal unions hâve encountered légal 
obstacles not présent in Canada. Uncertainties about the legality of 
collective bargaining and the signing of agreements hâve resulted in a 
slower development of municipal bargaining than in Canada. Although 
dampening its rate of growth and often affecting its outward forms the 
law has not prevented such bargaining from existing and growing. 
Goodine has reported that while written collective agreements were not 
widespread in 1946 there were « numerous and diverse types of em-
ployée relations plans, ordinances or other resolutions of law-making 
bodies which were unilatéral in form but which in fact represented the 
product of prior bilatéral negotiations with employée associations ».19 
In the 1950's some of the largest cities embarked on a policy of 
union récognition and collective bargaining. Following an extensive 
investigation and report by the New York City Department of Labor, 
Mayor Wagner in 1958 introduced collective bargaining for the nation's 
largest city. A year earlier Philadelphia had become the first major 
city to recognize one union as the exclusive bargaining agent.20 Cincinatti 
first formally recognized unions in 195.1, and in 1957 also granted 
exclusive récognition.21 Thèse examples show that municipal collective 
bargaining in the United States has been diverging from the traditional 
federal-state pattern. 
This complètes a quick survey of what may be cal ledthe conven-
tional practice. Thèse practices are currently changing in the direction 
of more collective bargaining. To the extent they do so the conventional 
wisdom loses its relevance. 
The Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom 
In a stable society the conventional wisdom may, for a time, describe 
the existing state of affairs adequately, but never completely. The 
diversity of social arrangements makes it incomplète; the restless change 
(19) GOODINE, M.R., op. cit., p. 241. 
(20) HAHT, W., op. cit., pp. 125, 126. 
(21) LANDER, A.S., «A Union View of Collective Bargaining in the Public Ser-
vice », Public Administration Review, Vol. XXII, No. 1 (Winter, 1962), p. 11. 
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of events threatens it with progressive obsolescence. At no tirne did 
this acceptable and comfortable body of ideas fully agrée with prevailing 
practice. 
As early as 1920 the U.S. Department of the Interior had signed a 
collective agreement covering workers on the Alaska railroad. The 
Government Printing Office, originally owned privately, operated from 
1861 to 1903 under a strict closed-shop agreement. When Congress 
established the Tennessee Valley Authority in 1933 it was freed from 
the administrative controls of the Civil Service Commission and given 
much of the freedom possessed by private firms. Since 1940 T.V.A. 
has regularly signed collective agreements with its blue collar and white 
collar workers and its bargaining system has become similar to that of 
many large privately-owned firms. The Bonneville Power Adrninistra-
tion, under the Department of the Interior, signed its first collective 
agreement in 1945 patterned after the T.V.A. agreements.22 
Instances of this type hâve been exceptions. Nevertheless their 
very existence has weakened the arguments of the conventional wisdom. 
They served as examples that collective bargaining by agencies of the 
U.S. Government was not necessarily illégal or unworkable. In Canada 
the successful expérience with collective bargaining in Saskatchewan 
has had a similar démonstration effect. 
In the United States the Wagner Act of 1935, and in Canada the 
order-in-council P.C. 1003 of 1944, required private employers to bar-
gain collectively with unions choosen by their employées. State and 
provincial governments passed similar laws. In Canada the provincial 
statutes imposed the same requirements on their subordinate units of 
government, the municipalities. Législation of this type left the superior 
governments vulnérable to the charge that they denied to their own 
employées rights and privilèges that they forced other employers to 
grant A committee of the American Bar Association in 1955 censured 
the Government for lagging behind industry.23 
À government which imposes on other employers certain obligations 
in dealing with their employées may not in good faith refuse to deal 
(22) See : TERRY, NEWELL B., « Collective Bargaining in the U.S. Department of 
the Interior», Public Administration Review, Vol. XXII, No. 1 (Winter, 1962), 
p. 20 ; and HART, W., op. cit^ pp. 86, 96-106. 
(23) Quoted, with other examples, by HART, W., op. cit., p. 3. 
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with its own public servants on a reasonably similar favourable basis, 
niodified, of course, to meet the exigencies of the public service. It 
should set the example for industry by being perhaps more eonsiderate 
that the law requires of private enterprise. 
In British Columbia the Provincial Government Employées* Asso-
ciation made this type of argument a central part of a large-scale 
publicity campaign in 1953, in an unsuccessful attempt to obtain arbi-
tration rights.24 The rapid growth of unions and collective bargaining 
in the private sector, stimulated by favourable législation, magnified 
the différence in status of public and private employées. This in turn 
led to pressure by civil servants for similar treatment. 
Government practices in matters not directly related to employées 
hâve weakened légal arguments against collective bargaining. Govern-
ments enter into many types of contracts — for public works, land pur-
chases, consultant services, and so on. Thèse contracts are often for a 
fixed period of time and frequently extend over more than one budget 
period. Légal authorities hâve long recognized the power of govern-
ments to do this.26 In what way, critics hâve asked, does the principle 
of sovereignty and the restrictions on delegating législative power permit 
governments to enter thèse contracts but prevent the signing of collective 
agreements with unions? 
A similar argument has been made with regard to arbitration pro-
cédures. Writing in 1961, Anderson said that, « ...arbitration of grie-
vances in public employment is almost unknown » in the United States.26 
But in other matters cities often submit claims by or against them to 
arbitration, and put arbitration clauses in public works contracts. Surely, 
the critics hâve suggested, a referral of employée disputes to advisory 
arbitration would not violate any delegation-of-power principle. 
The existence and successful functioning of collective bargaining 
in some areas of government employment; the development of bargain-
ing in the private sector protected and encouraged by législation; 
government practices in other matters — thèse events hâve been chal-
(24) LÉONARD, WILLIAM, « The Rights and Powers of a Civil Service Association », 
Fifth Annual Conférence, Institute of Public Administration of Canada, Proceedings, 
1953, p. 74. 
(25) ANDERSON, ARVID, « Labor Relations in the Public Service», Labor Law 
Journal, November, 1961, p. 1083. 
(26) Ibid., p. 1090. 
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lenging the conventional wisdom. Other changes hâve undoutedly 
contributed to the challenge. 
One of thèse has been the expanding total of public employment 
and the enlarging range of government activities and occupations. 
When New York City took over the opération of the city transit System, 
Michael Quill's Transport Workers Union, a C.I.O. affiliate that pos-
sessed représentation rights for the subway workers, could not simply 
be wished out of existence. The controversies arising from this new 
responsibility of the city led to the thorough study of public employment 
policies that paved the way for a full acceptance of collective bar-
gaining. 
Some of the Canadian provinces found themselves in a similar 
position when they assumed control of electric power production. In 
both British Columbia and New Brunswick unions of skilled electrical 
workers insisted upon retaining their bargaining rights with the transfers 
from private to public ownership. In New Brunswick this became a 
leading issue in a provincial élection. The incumbent Libéral Govern-
ment had refused bargaining rights to the Power Commission employées. 
It was defeated and the newly-elected Conservative Government showed 
its gratitude by amending the Labour Relations Act. 
Thèse and other events seem to be reducing the conventional 
wisdom to the status of conservative dogma. They hâve been having an 
increasing effect on législation and practice. Consider some of the 
récent changes in Canada. 
In March 1965, the Manitoba Government amended its Civil Service 
Act.27 During the preceding eighteen months a joint council representing 
the Province and its civil servants had held lengthy discussions. The 
amendments, reflecting the recommendations of this joint council, em-
powered the Government to enter into a collective agreement, to cover 
salaries and working conditions, with the Manitoba Government Em-
ployées' Association. On June 10, 1965, the Government and the Asso-
ciation signed a mémorandum of Agreement which recognized the 
Association as the sole bargaining agent for provincial civil servants, a 
récognition that is to continue as long as the Association maintains as 
members a majority of the employées. The amendments to the Civil 
(27) Bill 64, 1965. 
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Service Act also provided a dispute-settlement procédure involving a 
médiation board and, ultimately, a hearing by the Lieutenant-Governor-
in-Council. The amendments did not explicitly grant the right to 
strike. 
Récent changes in Québec law represent an even greater shift from 
the past. The Québec Labour Code that went into force September 1, 
1964, reflected new principles and a new philosophy.28 It granted most 
public service employées the right to strike subject only to those restric-
tions, common in Canada, that are associated with the certification and 
conciliation requirements (the latter no longer including a compulsory 
board hearing and report), and in emergency disputes a Taft-Hartley 
type of fact-finding procédure. Some three months later this newly-
gained freedom enabled employées of the Québec Liquor Board to 
engage in a lengthy but légal strike. 
The new Code did not apply to civil servants (except Liquor Board 
employées) subject to the Civil Service Act. But in 1965 the Législative 
Assembly changed the Civil Service Act to give provincial civil servants 
collective bargaining rights for salaries and working conditions.29 In 
addition the changes granted thèse employées (with some exceptions) 
the right to strike. The Act specifically named the Québec Civil Servants 
Union, a CNTU affiliate, as the employées* bargaining agent Thus 
civil servants in Québec, as in Saskatchewan, now hâve the right to 
bargain collectively and the right to strike against their employer, the 
Provincial Government. 
Récent changes in Manitoba and Québec provide the most obvious 
examples of the trend towards bargaining in public employment. Other 
provinces hâve not been immune to the winds of change. Alberta, where 
the staff association and the Government hâve held joint discussions, is 
expected to follow the example of the other two prairie provinces. On-
tario amended its Public Service Act in 1963 to establish a new 
negotiating procédure and now has partial agreements with some bran-
ches of the civil service. Traditionally the Atlantic Provinces hâve been 
more résistant than the western provinces to innovation and social 
change. Civil servants were later than those elsewhere in forming their 
own associations. It is significant, however, that in 1965, an employéeSô 
(28) Labour Gazette, Vol. LXIV, No. 12 (Dec. 1964), p. 1072. 
(29) Labour Gazette, Vol. LXV, No. 9 (Sept. 1965), p. 789. 
(30) G. BURNHAM. 
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of the Nova Scotia Department of Finance and Economies was the 
national président of the Canadian Fédération of Government Employée 
Organisations. The Halifax Chronicle-Herald has reported him as saying 
that the chief and immédiate aim of the Fédération is to get collective 
bargaining rights for public servants in ail ten provinces.31 At the 
tederal level, as is well-known, the Government is committed to the 
principle of collective bargaining, and its introduction now seems a 
certainty in the near future. 
It is impossible to give a state-by-state account of changes in the 
United States. At one extrême, as mentioned earlier, there are a few 
states that forbid organisations of their public employées. At the other 
extrême are a number of states that hâve recently supported, either by 
statute or by executive order, the idea of collective bargaining. In 1957, 
amendments to Minnesota's no-strike law « not only guaranteed the 
right to organize, but also contained a provision, unique in state law, for 
state conducted représentation hearings and secret ballot élection of 
collective bargaining agents ».32 A 1959 law in Wisconsin extended 
bargaining rights to municipal employées but not to state employées.3S 
The fifth édition of Bloom and Northrup's text, 1965, mentions 13 states 
as having some form of dispute settlement through collective bar-
gaining. 84 
There are obviously great différences among the many states. No 
common pattern has emerged; certainly there has been no rush to 
introduce bargaining for state civil servants. Changes in permitted 
practices in the last eight years indicate the beginning of a trend in this 
direction. It is a trend that is likely to continue. 
State governments commonly follow the pattern set in Washington, 
and the Fédéral Government broke new ground in 1962. Following 
the report of a spécial Task Force (chaired by Arthur Goldberg, the 
Secretary of Labor at that time) Président Kennedy issued the now 
famous Executive Order 10988.35 This Order reflected a frank accept-
a i ) November 22, 1965. 
(32) HART, W., op. cit., p. 134 (Italics added). 
(33) ANDERSON, ARVID, op. cit., p. 1069. Alaska and New Hampshire in 1959. 
Massachusetts and Illinois in 1960, are other states he mentions as having moved 
in the direction of granting bargaining rights. 
(34) BLOOM, CF. , NORTHRUP, H.R., < Economies of Labor Relations », Fifth 
édition, R.D. Irwin, Inc., 1965, p. 846. 
(35) The full text of the Order is given in the Industriel and Laboi' Relations 
Revietv, Vol. 15, No. 4 (July 1962), pp. 548-553. 
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ance of the desirability of collective bargaining in the fédéral civil 
service. By the terms of the Order employée associations with majority 
support in appropriate bargaining units, for the first time, could achieve 
exclusive récognition as bargainng agents with the power to negotiate 
formai agreements. In an intérim appraisal of the Order, Wilson Hart 
called it a smashing success for the politicians. « The new program 
will not be terminated... or emasculated by drastic revisions of the 
Order. » 36 If his prédiction is correct the Order is the équivalent of 
a death warrant for the eonventional wisdom. 
Public Versus Priva te Employment 
The difficulty of hammering out the détails of a bargaining System 
suitable for government employment is one of the main obstacles to a 
more rapid introduction of such Systems. There is an understandable 
and perhaps unavoidable tendency to borrow the procédures and prac-
tices prevailing in the private sector, altering thèse where necessary to 
fit the conditions of public employment. If it is possible to talk about 
a national industrial relations System37 then predictably the sub-systems 
arising for government employées will strongly reflect the national 
forms. 
Can the industrial relations System of the private sector be applied 
to public employment? To what extent does the nature of government 
employment raise unique problems? One way to approach thèse ques-
tions would be to focus attention on some leading features of the national 
industrial relations System — the right of association, defined bargaining 
units, exclusive bargaining agents, dispute settlement procédures —- and 
to discuss each in turn with référence to its suitability for collective 
bargaining between a government and its employées. An alternative 
approach is to ask in what way does government employment differ 
from non-government employment. Only if there exists significant dif-
férences between the two is there any reason for assuming that the 
bargaining system in one will not work as well (or as poorly), without 
modifications, in the other. It follows that modifications which may be 
desired are of two types: those desired because of the unique features 
(36) HART, W., € The U.S. Civil Service Learas to Live with Executive Order 
10988 : An Intérim Appraisal », Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 17, 
No. 2 (January 1964), p. 213. 
(37) See : DUNLOP, J., Industrial Relations Systems, N.Y., Henry Holt and 
Company, 1958. 
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of government employment; and those desired because it is thought 
that similar changes are needed in the private sector. 
Government employment does differ from non-government em-
ployment. It is not easy, however, to capture the essence of the distinc-
tion in a few words. A few false distinctions may be noted first. The 
sheer size of government is one. There are some private firms that hâve 
revenue from sales greater than the total tax revenue of any government 
in Canada, and of any but the fédéral and perhaps some of the largest 
state governments in the United States. Related to size is the great 
diversity of occupations and activities in government employment un-
matched, at least at the fédéral level, by the largestj firms in the private 
sector. This appears to be more a différence of degree than of kind. 
The size and diversity of government activities obviously créâtes diffi-
culties in constructing a workable bargaining System, but large private 
firms encounter similar difficulties. If any large-scale development of 
white-collar unionization should occur in the private sector thèse simi-
larities would be more immediately obvious. 
The large proportion of white-collar and professional workers in 
government employment is another feature sometimes noted. This may 
account in part for the slovver development of collective bargaining in 
government but it does not appear to be more than a différence of degree 
from private employment. Note, first, that government employment 
includes a much higher percentage of blue-collar workers than may 
commonly be thought. In the United States W. Hart has stated that 
approximately one-third of fédéral government employées are paid in 
accordance with hourly or per diem wage schedules set up by the exe-
cutive departments and agencies.38 In municipal employment the per-
centage of blue-collar workers is undoubtedly higher. Second, the ratio 
of white-collar to blue-collar workers has been rising in private em-
ployment. Bargaining difficulties stemming from the existence of a large 
proportion of white-collar employées in the labour force do not appear 
to be unique to government employment. 
The lack of any clear differentiation between employées and 
employers falls in the same category of false distinctions. A deputy-
minister is an employée of the government and a gênerai manager is an 
employée of a business corporation. Their powers and responsibilities 
(38) HART, W., «The U.S. Civil Service Learns to Live with Executive Order 
10988 », op. cit., p. 219. 
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greatly exceed those possessed by the majority of employées. At lower 
levels of power and responsibility the dividing line becomes blurred in 
private business as well as in govemment. This is not to say that there 
are no difficulties in determining which employées should be included 
or excluded from bargaining units or that the difficulties may not be 
greater in government employment. But the problem itself is not a 
spécial one existing only in government. 
A commonly posited différence is the vital nature of government 
services. Obviously the maintenance of law and order or national 
defence is vital to society and manufacturing hoola-hoops, funny-putty 
or super balls is not, to take extrême examples. Just as obviously the 
maintenance of janitorial services in a government building or the 
services of labourers on an expérimental farm are not vital whereas a 
blackout from the interruption of electric power provided by privately-
owned utilities endangers the health and safety of the affected com-
munities. Logically any argument for spécial bargaining procédures 
or restraints based on the essentiality of government services applies 
with similar force to essential services provided by the private sector 
of the economy. The problem is one of emergency disputes and thèse 
must be classified on the basis of the services rendered, not on the basis 
of whether the employer is a privately-owned corporation or a govern-
ment. 
Activities of private enterprises are profit-seeking; most activities of 
government are not. While this différence should not be ignored there 
is a danger of over-rating its significance for collective bargaining in 
government. In the private sector the primary effect of profit-seeking 
on collective bargaining is the imposition of limits on what employérs 
think they can offer to their employées during the course of négociations. 
Governments are not subject to the restraints of declining profit margins 
but this does not mean the absence of pressures to resist employée 
demands. The unpopularity of high or rising tax rates, the competing 
demands for government expenditures in a wide range of activities, the 
complaints likely to arise from private employérs competing with the 
government for available manpower, and the existence of national 
« guide-lines » for wage increases can produce pressures as effective as 
falling profits against excessive generosity by governments to their em-
ployées. In addition, of course, some government activities are profit-
seeking or resuit in profits while pursuing other objectives; and in the 
private sector collective bargaining exists in some organisations that 
neither seek nor obtain profits. 
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A theory of public employment that distinguishes it from private 
employment must be based on the spécial status of the state as an 
employer.S9 The development of collective bargaining in the private 
sector reflected, among other things, a power struggle among rival 
interest groups in society. One resuit was a shift in the relative power 
of private groups. The state acted, and still acts, as an arbiter of thèse 
conflicts; in the United States and Canada primarily by establishing, 
enforcing, and altering the framework of rules goveming the power 
struggle. In this way the state acts as the custodian of the public interest 
ensuring, at least, that group conflict does not destroy the social fabric 
of the state itself. 
In collective bargaining with its own employées the state necessarily 
retains its rôle as an umpire in the public interest. In addition, however, 
this rôle must be combined with one in which the state is a direct party 
of interest in any conflict arising from the employer — employée 
relationship. Thus, there is a power relationship which differs funda-
mentally from that existing between a union and an employer in the 
private sector. It is not just a matter of the state employer having much 
more power than its organized employées. That is often true as well 
in the private sector. What makes them différent is the nature; of the 
state's power and its responsibilities. An analysis of the state as an 
employer cannot avoid an examination of the nature of the state itsélf. 
No attempt is made hère to discuss rival political ideas about what 
a state is, or should be. In Canada and the United States the dominant 
view is that the state possesses sovereign powers. Citizens view it as the 
final and ultimate source of légal authority. Assuming that this view 
of the state is unlikely to be seriously challenged or to change in the 
future, the relevant question is what are the implications of this spécial 
status of the employer for a system of collective bargaining in govern-
ment employment. 
In the past collective bargaining was looked upon as a challenge 
to or a dilution of the state's power, something that could not be per-
mitted if the state was to retain its sovereignty. There was merit in 
such a view only on the assumption that the sovereign state was opposed 
to collective bargaining. If a sovereign state décides that a bargaining 
system is désirable there is nothing in the concept of sovereignty to 
(39) For a more complète discussion of some of the ideas that foliow see : 
GOODINE, M.R., op. cit., pp. 21-61. 
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prevent the state and its employées from establishing such a System. 
To argue the contrary is to argue that the state's power is something 
less than sovereign. 
There seems to be no reason why the spécial power status of the 
state should require a formai bargaining structure significantly différent 
from that existing in the private sector. The ideas of units appropriât^ 
for collective bargaining, persons employed in a confidential capacity, 
exclusive représentation by organisations with majority employée support, 
and so on will probably fit the conditions of govemment employment 
better than they hâve fitted some segments of private employment. 
Admittedly there are severe difficulties in working out the détails in 
attempts to transfer thèse ideas to the public service. There were many 
difficulties in first applying the ideas in private employment. No 
attempt is made hère to examine thèse difficulties. The direct partici-
pants are the ones who must construct the détails of a workable system; 
and a system established as a resuit of joint délibérations will be the 
one most likely to work well. In principle the idea of sovereignty does 
not interfère with the adoption of the formai structure of the private-
sector bargaining system. 
There is at least one other fundamental distinction between the state 
employer and other employers. Sovereign power has not been the resuit 
of some divinely-ordered permanent system for ordering political rela-
tionships. Rather, the idea of sovereignty is a création of the human 
mind in its centuries'-old ceaseless search and expérimentation to obtain 
a satisfactory form of govemment. The idea has been retained because 
it has been found useful in the pursuit of a state's objective. In the 
western libéral démocratie tradition a paramount state objective is the 
ordering of social affairs for the protection and enhancement of indivi-
dual freedom and welfare. It is commonly held that it is the citizens 
who are the ultimate repository of the state's sovereign power. By 
voting, thèse citizens temporarily grant the exercise of their sovereign 
power to elected représentatives who form a govemment that acts in a 
trustée capacity for ail. While civil servants may be looked upon as 
employées of the state their immédiate employer, and the one with 
whom bargaining must be conducted, is a govemment. This govemment 
employer is charged with the responsibility of advancing the objectives 
of the state, objectives that are unique in that they are not the primary 
purposes of other associations or of other employers. 
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There is no need to debate the question whether the objectives of 
the state hâve a higher normative value than those of other associations. 
Unless a state has the power to adjust the relationships among its internai 
entities, and their relationships to the state itself, there is little likelihood 
that thèse entities that collectively make up the state will be able to 
achieve their objectives, regardless of their normative values. In the 
démocratie tradition the individual, not the state, is ail important. But 
the state is ail-important as a necessary condition for the achievement 
of the highest individual aspirations. It is surely this responsibility of 
the state that justifies its possession of sovereign power. Thus the state 
as an employer differs from ail other employers not only because it 
possesses sovereign powers but also, and more importantly, because it 
has différent responsibilities. This has direct implications for a collec-
tive bargaining System in the public service. 
First, the state must use its sovereign powers when any action 
threatens its continued existence. Even when its existence is not 
threatened there may well be occasions when the state would be fully 
justified in using its power to overcome obstacles to the achievement 
of its gênerai objectives. A lengthy strike by ail civil servants would 
be an example of the first type; a strike by ail guards at one penitentiary 
an example of the second type. 
The question of strikes by civil servants is the most dramatic and 
contentious part of this gênerai topic. There are sharply divided views 
on whether ail such strikes should be prohibited, substituting some form 
of arbitration for the settlement of disputes, or whether strike prohibi-
tions should apply only to employées rendering essential services. Ad-
vocates of a complète freedom to strike are rare. 
M. R. Godine has given the strongest argument for prohibiting ail 
strikes. *° 
. . . a strike in the government service which does not impose immé-
diate and profound injury upon the commimity stili constitutes an 
open défiance of public authority. It is essentially the substitution of 
a private or group judgment for a government décision. Public 
acquiescence in such conduct implies the surrender by the government 
of the ultimate right to judge the merits of conflicting social claims 
which must of necessity include those disputes to which the govern-
ment itself is a party. 
(40) Jfcfci., pp. 171-2. 
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« The statu quo state cannot permit group défiance and in so doing 
retain its quality of statehood. To wait upon conséquences is to 
deny the validity of any particular priority to state décisions per se. 
In brief the resolution of the strike problem in the public service 
dépends in the final analysis not upon an évaluation of social repercus-
sions but upon a theory of the nature and value of the state. If its 
nature is held to demand a concentration of authority in excess of that 
possessed by any other group, a strike in the public service becomes 
almost a contradiction in terms. Its very rationale permits and indeed 
requires the state to suppress a challenge to its authority. * 
Reduced to syllogistic form Godine's argument is: 
Major Premise — The state cannot permit défiance of its ultimate 
authority. 
Minor Premise — Any strike in government service « constitutes an 
open défiance of public authority ». 
Conclusion — The state cannot permit any strikes in the public 
service. 
The minor premises of this argument is questionable. It does not 
allow for the possibility that a government may, on occasion, recognized 
some benefits to itself or to the state from strike action by its employées. 
That is, the state though vested with final authoriy need not look upon 
ail public service strikes as a challenge to or definace of this authority, 
It is at least conceivable that a government might wish to use strikes 
as a part of its strategy recognizing, what has long been known, that 
strikes can hâve a bénéficiai effect on the future demands and behaviour 
of an employée group. 
The strike by Canadian postal workers in the summer of 1965 was, 
indeed, « the substitution of a group judgment for a government déci-
sion ». Did « public acquiescence in such conduct » really imply « the 
surrender by the government of the ultimate right to judge the merits »? 
By permitting this group défiance did the Canadian State really lose « its 
quality of statehood »? Surely the answer is that the Canadian govern-
ment temporarily refrained from using the full force of its sovereign 
power; it did not surrender its ultimate right to take stronger action. 
Godine's argument has an attractive logical simpïicity that does not do 
justice to the results of expérience. 
It is not necessary to view ail strikes by government employées as 
direct challenges to a state's sovereign power. If a législature has 
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passed a law making such strikes illégal, a strike then becomes ain open 
défiance of the law. If no anti-strike législation exists a strike can then 
be viewed as an unwillingness of employée associations to accepl: « final 
offers » made by government administrators charged with the responsi-
bility of collectively negotiating an agreement. For an incumbent 
government the strike raises the question of whether or not its; consé-
quences warrant the exercise of the state's sovereign power. If the 
government chooses not to use its ultimate power to impose a settlement 
the continuance of the strike, logically, should not be looked upon as a 
challenge to, or défiance of, that power. Rather, it is a défiance of the 
position of the government acting in an administrative, not a law-
maldng capacity. 
While the strike question is the most dramatic one its importance 
may easily be over-emphasized. Civil servants in the United States and 
Canada are not prone to strike. Many individual government employées 
abhor the idea of strikes and the constitutions of some associations 
explicitly rule out such action. There is no good reason to think that 
the introduction of a formai system of bargaining would be followed by 
any significant increase in strikes, whether legally permitted or not. The 
expérience of Saskatchewan suggests otherwise. It is quite possible that 
with a formai bargaining system governments would be induced to make 
necessary and désirable changes in salaries and other employment terms 
more rapidly than heretofore thereby avoiding a possible progressive 
détérioration in morale and a build-up of discontent, frustration, and 
dis-satisfaction that could lead to thoughts of work-stoppages. Govern-
ment employées and their associations may, or may not, be more respon-
sable than other employées and their unions. This is probably an irre-
levant considération. What is relevant is that government employées 
are well aware of the responsibilities and power of their employer. It 
is this knowledge as much as anything that can be relied upon to keep 
strikes in the public service at a minimum. 
There is no compelling reason for a state to prohibit ail public 
service work stoppages regardless of their type, magnitude or duration. 
When one of the highest values of a state is that of individual freedom, 
including freedom of association, the state has an obligation to avoid, 
when possible, actions which restrict the range of this freedom. A state 
does not lose « its quality of statehood > when its government choose to 
permit its employées to engage in a strike. A state does lose, or has lost, 
sometbing of « its quality of statehood » when it cannot effectively use 
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its sovereign power. The govemment's responsibility is to ensure that 
the use of state power is effective when required, not to wield it indis-
criminately in every dispute. Expérience in the United States has shown 
that the outlawing of public service strikes does not prevent them from 
occuring. The New York City transit strike was the most récent notable 
example. Laws that governments find unwise to enforce are better left 
unwritten. In govemment employment as in private employment mutual 
agreement rather than unilatéral dictation, before or after a strike, is the 
préférable outcome of a dispute. 
Setting aside the contentions question of strikes, does the unique 
status of the state as an employer require other spécial arrangements in 
a public employment bargaining System? A suggestion often made is 
that an arbitration procédure should be used to settle disputes in the 
public service. If strikes are prohibited to ail employées or to any 
specified groups the right to submit disputes to arbitration seems 
justified. As a method for establishing new contract terms, however, 
arbitration has some well-known shortcomings that hâve prevented its 
wide-spread use in the private sector. In the public sector there is an 
additional problem arising from the sovereign nature of the state. A 
govemment if it wished, could provide by législation for the submission 
of disputes to binding arbitration, and yet refuse, if it wished, to accept 
any particular award after it had been made. The concept of sovereignty 
requires the rétention of authority to over-rule an arbitration board in 
a dispute to which the govemment itself was a contestant. To avoid 
the embarassment that might resuit in the event a govemment found 
it necessary to refuse an arbitration décision, it would appear to be 
unwise for a govemment to establish initially any System of binding 
arbitration. The most that a govemment with sovereign powers should 
do is to commit itself to a compulsory arbitration procédure in which 
the awards themselves would not be binding on the govemment. In 
practice, advisory award from a responsible and respected arbitration 
body could be expected to hâve much influence on both parties. It is 
quite conceivable that governments and employée associations would 
regularly accept such awards. If so, the advisory awards would hâve 
the same effect as binding awards and there would be no question 
about the govemment's rétention of its sovereign powers. 
In principle there do not appear to be any terms of employment 
that a govemment, because of its spécial status, must exclude from the 
scope of bargaining. Some terms in collective agreements in the privàte 
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sector however may hâve différent implications for the public sector, 
and a government could be justified in refusing to accept similar terms 
for public employment. Clauses dealing with union récognition and 
union security are of this type. A closed-shop contract is the most 
obvious example. It is possible that among the far-flung range of 
government activities there are some for which a closed-shop would be 
a satisfactory arrangement. In gênerai, the merit System and the use of 
compétitive examinations to sélect successful job candidates would rule 
out a closed-shop contract. 
Whether or not a government should agrée to a union shop clause 
is more open to debate. In the private sector unions hâve sought union 
shop clauses to lessen the threat, from hostile employers and non-union 
employées, to the union's security and established employment standards. 
If a government explicitly accepts collective bargaining the employée 
associations would not be faced with a hostile employer seeMng to 
destroy them by promoting rival groups and encouraging employées to 
avoid union membership. There might be isolated instances of such 
behaviour by some administrative officiais who were not in sympathy 
with the introduction into government of a bargaining system. The 
remedy would be exposure; administrators hâve a duty to accept and 
follow the government's policy regardless of their personal beliefs about 
its wisdom. Thus the argument for a union shop clause in public em-
ployment loses much of its force. 
In addition the argument against a union shop is strong in public 
employment. Unlike the profit-seeking employer in the private sector 
the state has (or should hâve) as a primary objective the extension of 
individual freedom. A union shop clause would hâve the effect of 
forcing some employées against their wishes, to join an association or 
lose their employment. Thèse arguments lead to the conclusion that a 
government in gênerai should not agrée to a union shop in public 
employment. The Rand formula could be used to diminish the employée 
frictions that « free riders » tend to create. 
Employée associations do not necessarily restriot their activities to 
the negotiations and administration of collective agreements. In the 
private sector unions may engage in political lobbying and in more 
direct partisan political activities. Does the tradition and the law 
regarding the political impartiality of civil servants require that civil 
service associations refrain from partisan political action? The topic 
demands a more complète analysis than can be given hère. 
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It should be noted that it is not easy to define what constitutes 
partisan actions. A union newspaper, for example, by its choice of 
photographs of political leaders and the frequency of their appearance, 
by the type and length of its news reporting, and by the choice and 
content of editorials can attempt to influence the political choices of its 
members. Educational programmes for members can seek to do the 
same thing. Laws that attempt to prohibit or restrict political action 
encounter many difficulties in defining the permissible area of beha-
viour. 
Another point to note is that civil servants are commonly prohibited 
from political activities which other citizens in a democracy are encou-
raged to undertake, almost as a part of their duty as good citizens. In 
part this was a price paid by civil servants for the élimination of the 
spoils System. To protect civil servants and the civil service from elected 
officiais, who were ail too anxious to reward their supporters and 
penalize thoses who were not, was a highly désirable objective. It is 
not at ail clear that its achievement required the protection of candidates 
for political office from partisan political action by civil servants, thereby 
denying important citizenship rights to thèse employées. With the 
great growth of government employment the practical importance of 
this question has much increased. 
There are other reasons for having the principle of impartiality 
apply to civil servants. They must faithfully administer the government's 
policies regardless of the political party in power or their own dislike 
for its policies. Civil servants must also be impartial, and appear to be 
impartial, in their officiai relationships with the gênerai public. Granting 
the force of thèse requirements, there exists large numbers of employées 
performing routine or menial tasks in which there is no opportunity for 
the employée to thwart government policies or to discriminate against 
other citizens. If such employées wish to campaign actively for the 
élection of a candidate for political office why should they not be 
allowed to do so? One rôle of an employée association could be to 
protect such employées from political reprisais, thèse being processed 
as grievances. Perhaps the time has corne for a challenge to the conven-
tional wisdom that underlies the impartiality rules of the civil service. 
In the private sector in the United States and Canada the gênerai 
approach of the Iaw has been to say that the internai affairs of a union 
are not the business of the employer. It is questionable whether a 
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govemment should apply the same principle to associations of public 
employées. Consider the case in which the effective control of a union 
is held by persons committed to an alien form of govemment. In 
private employment this does not represent a direct threat to the exis-
tence of the employer's business and the control of politically subversive 
groups is not one of his primary responsibilities. It is not unknown for 
employers to hâve a successful bargaining relationship with Communist-
dominated unions. A govemment has a direct responsibility to main-
tain the existing System of govemment, and its civil servants at the very 
least hâve the responsibility to avoid actions designed to subvert the 
constituted order. It could be argued that there are some govemment 
activities in which a govemment could tolerate an employée association 
under subversive-type leadership. Equally, it is clear, there are acti-
vities such as those of a départaient of defence in which it seems to be 
beyond question that a govemment as an employer could not remain 
indiffèrent about the nature of the employées' association. In brief, a 
govemment can require employers in the private sector to refrain from 
intervening in the internai affairs of a labour union; a govemment 
should not apply universally this same idea in a collective bargaining 
system for public employment. 
Nothing written above is meant to imply in any way that civil ser-
vants are likely to be subversive in thought or action or likely to allow 
their associations to corne under the control of subversive leadership. 
An exercise in logical analysis cannot ignore this possibility, however, 
since expérience in the private sector has shown that power in employée 
organisations can be captured by persons seeking to use the organisations 
for their own purposes, not necessarily those supported by the mem-
bership-at-large. Indeed this raises another question, that of the rela-
tionship of the individual employée to his association. 
Does a govemment hâve an obligation to ensure that an employée 
association remains reponsive to the wishes of its membership? If a 
govemment agrées to a Rand-formula check-off arrangement does the 
govemment hâve any obligation to impose a system of financial accoun-
tability? Is the opération of an association^ internai judicial procédures 
something that a govemment can ignore? Thèse questions can be 
subsumed in a more gênerai one. Can the idea of unions as voluntary 
private bodies be transferred to the public service? Questions of this 
type hâve been raised with regard to unions in the private sector and 
governments hâve not entirely refrained from législation to regulate 
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some internai union affairs. Problems in this area appear to be common 
to both private and public employment. The introduction of collective 
bargaining in public employment may hâve the effect of attracting more 
attention to them. On the other hand many though not ail, of the ques-
tions lose their relevance in the absence of compulsory union member-
ship. It has been contended above that there is less need for a union 
shop in public employment. If employée associations do not insist upon 
union shop clauses governments will hâve fewer reasons for seeking 
some régulation of the associations' internai affairs. 
If the foregoing distinctions are valid ones they indicate that a 
public bargaining System must differ in some respects from that which 
has developed in the private sector. The différences arise from the 
responsibilities of the state and its need to maintain its sovereign powers 
for use, if necessary, in achieving its objectives. Dispute settlement 
procédures, negotiable terms, partisans political activities, and internai 
affairs of employée organisations hâve been examined above as areas in 
which some différences might be expected or required. There has been 
too little expérience with public bargaining Systems beyond the muni-
cipal level in the United States and Canada to permit more than a limited 
discussion with tentative conclusions. If the trend towards bargaining 
in public employment continues, an increasing number of persons may 
be expected to direct their attention to this topic and to provide the 
more complète analysis that its importance warrants. 
Some Observations 
How successful a public bargaining System becomes will dépend in 
part upon how it is initially constructed and in part upon the attitudes 
of the participants. In the private sector collective bargaining developed 
in an atmosphère of hostility and conflict, at times erupting into armed 
clashes. This had its effect on the shape and on the results of private 
bargaining and eventually on the laws regulating it. If a government 
voluntarily agrées to establish a public bargaining System there is no 
need for the government to take the défensive attitude of an employer 
who is determined to minimise a union's power or achievements. Instead 
the government can direct its efforts to the construction of a System that 
it expects will yield positive benefits for the public service and its em-
ployées. 
A government, possessing ultimate power, does not need to impose 
initially a host of derailed restrictions on the behaviour of civil service 
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associations. The enormous scope of government activities makes 
unwise any attempt to find gênerai rules that will fit ail situations. 
Difficult questions about the right to strike, to engage in partisan poli-
tical activity, union shop clauses, interférence in internai union affairs, 
and others do not hâve to be settled by législation before bargaining 
can begin. They are matters for which as far as possible the initiating 
législation should remain silent, waiting for the test of expérience to 
détermine what, if any, restrictions may be required. Such an ad hoc 
approach provides an élément of flexibility highly désirable for a bar-
gaining System encompassing such diversity as is found in government 
employment. 
This ad hoc approach could hâve another benefit. It would be an 
expression of faith by a government in the reasonableness and respon-
sibility of its civil servants. If new procédures are initially hemmed 
in with législative restrictions which civil servants might interpret as 
reflecting a lack of trust in them, it could resuit in unnecessary irritation 
at the beginning of the bargaining relationship. This could be avoided 
by using the ad hoc approach. 
The development of bargaining in public employment has some 
implications for the future growth of labour unions. White collar occu-
pations make up the largest remaining area for possible gains in union 
membership. The example of white collar and professional employées 
belonging to unions that bargain collectively with governments should 
make it easier for unions to organize similar workers in non-government 
occupations. 
There would also appear to be some implications for the future rôle 
of civil service commissions. Traditionally the commissions hâve per-
formed many of the functions of a personnel department plus serving 
as a shield against the damaging thrusts of political patronage in the 
public service. It is possible to envisage strong employée associations 
jointly sharing with a civil service commission the responsibility for 
maintaining a merit system. Attempts to use the civil service for poli-
tical patronage could be puMicized, protested, and perhaps made the 
subject of formai grievances that could be carried to arbitration. If em-
ployée associations could effectively perform this protective function 
there would be less need for an indépendant civil service commission. 
With a collective bargaining system, on the other hand, there would be 
a greater need for some body directly responsible for the government's 
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labour relations with its employées: proposing gênerai policies, co-ordi-
nating the practices of individual departments, evaluating the bargâining 
procédures, keeping records of ail agreements, formai grievances and 
arbitration décisions, conducting wage and salary research. Civil service 
commissions are not about to be abolished. As expérience in gained 
with collective bargâining their protective function may be dâninished 
and their industrial relations function grow in importance. 
Finally it should be noted that the Canadian developments hâve not 
been a direct import from the United States. In gênerai, public service 
employées do not belong to international unions with headquarters in 
the United States. Canadian govemments hâve imposed fewer restric-
tions on their employées in such matters as joining unions or prohibiting 
strikes by législation. Provincial government, by législation, provided 
collective bargâining opportunities for municipal employées much earlier 
than in the United States where similar législation is not yet common. 
Some Canadian provinces hâve gone much farther in providing 
meaningful bargâining rights to provincial employées than has been 
done by any of the states. As noted earlier Président Kennedy intro-
duced collective bargâining at the fédéral level in 1962. Some four 
years later the Canadian Government in Ottawa is expected to do the 
same thing. But there is an important différence. Executive Order 
10988 provided limited bargâining rights not extending to such key 
issues as rates of pay and standard working hours. Such items are 
included in the proposais for collective bargâining by fédéral employées 
in Canada.41 Consequently the proposed Canadian system is a much 
more meaningful one for the employées. There hâve been parallel 
trends in both countries but it seems that the traditional United States* 
influence on labour practices in Canada has been relatively unimpor-
tant in the development of bargâining by govemments. 
The trends themselves are clear. That comfortable collection of 
ideas about the incompatibility of collective bargâining and public 
employment is becoming absolete. It will eventually be replaced, not 
without some turmoil, by a new conventional wisdom in closer agrée-
ment with the world of events. 
(41) For the U.S.A., see : SCHNEIDER, B.V.H., op. cit., pp. 97-121. For Canada, 
sec : Report of the Freparatory Committee on Collective Bargâining in the Public 
Service. Queen's Printer, Ottawa, July 1965. 
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LA FONCTION PUBLIQUE, LA NÉGOCIATION COLLECTIVE ET LA 
SAGESSE POPULAIRE: ETATS-UNIS ET CANADA 
En général, les employés civils aux Etats-Unis et au Canada n'ont pas pu 
négocier collectivement avec leurs employeurs. Les gouvernements ont déterminé 
unilatéralement les termes et conditions d'emploi. Cette pratique était en accord 
avec les vues largement acceptées sur le statut spécial des gouvernments en tant 
qu'employeurs. On peut appeler ces vues la sagesse populaire. Selon celle-ci, la 
négociation collective dans la fonction publique n'était pas nécessaire, pratique ni 
légale. Des événements ont contredit cette sagesse au point qu'elle devient désuète. 
Aux niveaux du fédéral, des états et des provinces, des organisations d'employés 
civils existent depuis plusieurs années. Il y a eu liberté d'association mais, à l'excep-
tion de la Saskatchewan, on n'a pas connu avant les années 1960 de système élaboré 
de négociation collective pour la plupart des employés civils. Aux niveaux muni-
cipaux, et particulièrement au Canada, la négociation collective a été plus répandue. 
Plusieurs facteurs ont diminué l'influence de la sagesse populaire : 
1. Des exceptions heureuses à la pratique générale (v.g. en Saskatchewan 
et à la Tennessee Valley Authority) ont démontré que la négociation n'était pas 
nécessairement illégale ni impraticable. 
2. Une législation favorable a stimulé la croissance de la négociation dans le 
secteur privé et amplifié la différence du statut des employés des secteurs public 
et privé. On a accusé les gouvernements de refuser à leurs propres employés des 
droits qu'ils forçaient les autres employeurs d'accorder. 
3. Dans des sujets étrangers aux relations de travail, les gouvernements se 
sont souvent engagés par contrats, et se sont soumis à l'arbitrage des griefs. 
4. La substitution de la propriété privée à la propriété publique a souvent 
opposé les gouvernements à des syndicats établis qu'ils ne pouvaient pas ignorer. 
Des changements récents dans les deux pays, indiquent une tendance vers la 
négociation collective dans la fonction publique. En 1965 les provinces du Québec 
et du Manitoba ont amendé leur loi de la Fonction publique afin de permettre la 
négociation collective. D'autres provinces envisagent des changements similaires. 
Le Rapport Heeney a recommandé un système de négociation pour les employés 
civils fédéraux. Aux Etats-Unis, l'arrêté-en-conseil 10988 (janvier 1962) du président 
Kennedy introduisit la possibilité pour les employés civils de négocier collective-
ment. Au niveau des états, il y eut moins de changements significatifs vers un 
système de négociation. On peut s'attendre, toutefois, que plusieurs états; suivront 
les sentiers déjà tracés par Washington. 
Est-il possible de transporter dans le secteur public les procédures et pratiques 
qui se sont développées dans le secteur privé? L'emploi dans le secteur public 
diffère de celui dans le secteur privé en raison du statut particulier et des respon-
sabilités spéciales de l'Etat. Celui-ci possède le pouvoir légal ultime. Et surtout, 
l'Etat démocratique a la responsabilité de mettre de l'ordre dans les affaires sociales 
en vue de protéger et de promouvoir le bien-être et la liberté des individus. L'Etat 
en tant qu'employeur diffère donc essentiellement de tous les autres employeurs. 
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Ceci comporte des implications directes sur un système de négociation collective 
dans la fonction publique. 
L'Etat doit utiliser son pouvoir souverain lorsque quelque chose menace son 
existence ou l'empêche sérieusement d'atteindre ses objectifs généraux. Il ne s'en 
suit pas qu'on doive rendre illégales les grèves des employés civils, ou qu'on doive 
supprimer toutes les grèves du genre en vertu du pouvoir de l'Etat. La question 
de la grève est la plus dramatique, mais on peut facilement lui donner une impor-
tance exagérée. 
Il n'est probablement pas sage qu'un gouvernement souverain soumette des 
conflits d'intérêt à un arbitrage à sentence exécutoire. Le plus qu'il doive faire est 
de s'en remettre à une procédure d'arbitrage obligatoire conduisant à des recom-» 
mandations. En pratique, ces dernières exerceraient une forte influence. 
En principe, selon toute apparence, il n'existe aucun sujet qu'un gouvernement, 
à cause de son statut particulier, doive exclure du champ des négociations. En 
pratique, compte tenu du système de notation du personnel utilisé dans les nomi-
nations, une entente d'atelier fermé ne conviendrait pas. La présence d'un atelier 
syndical se défend moins bien dans le secteur public que dans le secteur privé. 
Quand la négociation collective se développera davantage dans le secteur 
public, il surgira probablement des problèmes d'affiliations politiques et d'activités 
des organisations d'employés civils. Un problème semblable apparaîtrait à l'avène-
ment (improbable) d'un leadership et d'un contrôle de type subversif d'un tel 
syndicat. On peut se demander si un gouvernement devrait suivre le principe 
courant à savoir que les affaires internes d'un syndicat ne regarde pas l'employeur. 
L'influence traditionnelle des Etats-Unis sur les relations de travail au Canada 
n'a pas été importante dans l'élaboration de la négociation collective par les 
gouvernements. En général les changements au Canada sont apparus plus tôt, 
et ont introduit des droits de négociation plus significatifs, que ceux survenus 
aux Etats-Unis. 
